Official Warsaw reiterated that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline poses a threat to the security of “the entire region,” but primarily to Ukraine. Why is Poland so worried about Ukrainian earnings on the transit of Russian gas, given its many claims to the “glorification of the Banderaites”? And is it true that after the project is completed, Moscow can do “whatever it wants” with Kiev?
“I don’t think we have tough anti-Russian rhetoric in Poland. However, there are some issues that we do not like, for example, Nord Stream 2. This project will allow Moscow to cut off Ukraine from gas supplies to Europe, and then do whatever it wants with this country. ”
These words of Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki sound discordant with the news that Denmark seems to have withdrawn its last objections to the completion of Nord Stream 2 and now only US sanctions are delaying the final implementation of the project. But his statement is remarkable to others: the Pole lied where he wanted to tell the truth, and told the truth when he wanted to mislead.
In objective reality, Russophobia in the Polish Republic under the control of the Law and Justice Party is really off scale. This is also recognized by those Poles (for example, journalists) who work in the Russian Federation and do not have any sympathy for the Russian government: the image of Poland in Russia is much more pleasant and benevolent than the image of Russia in Poland.
The real master does not care about this circumstance as a whole, they say, but there is something not to love about us, although it would be worth paying attention at least to the fact that in the Russian political and public consciousness there are simply no ideas of a “new occupation of Poland” or revenge on the Poles for what whatever, although the Polish propaganda insists that such thoughts exist and that Moscow is ready to continue its “bloody path over Polish corpses”, just give it.
This is the “tough anti-Russian rhetoric”, the existence of which the Polish prime minister denies, although, most likely, he sincerely believes that there is less hatred towards our country in Poland than it could have been.
As for Nord Stream 2, the reasons for Polish hatred for it are much broader than Morawiecki would like to show.
First, it is pure ambition. The Russian-German gas transmission project was originally conceived to bypass Poland, which, of course, Poland did not like – it wanted to receive its share of the transit. Of course, Gazprom did not have objective reasons for simply sharing profits with Russophobic Poles, of course, but ambition and ambition do not depend on objective reasons.
For example, in Poland, at one time, such an interpretation was actively discussed that Moscow is obliged to feed the Poles with gas as compensation for suffering suffered in the past.
Secondly, which is much more important, Poland is the most aggressive conductor of American interests in the EU, which is indicative of its pride. History taught the Poles not to trust the European powers in matters of their own security, so they began to look for support overseas immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain – and they quickly found it, relying on the significant Polish diaspora in the United States and Canada.
Since then, Warsaw has been a lobbyist lobbyist for Washington, regardless of who sits in the White House – Republican or Democrat. The president’s partisanship does not in any way affect the interests of American LNG sellers, whose direct competitor is Nord Stream 2. Poles buy American LNG and put a spoke in the wheels of the Russian project, that is, to give them their due, they behave like loyal allies or vassals (depending on the angle of view), but it is not accepted to talk about it out loud, since it contradicts the principles of European solidarity – the energy alliance Poles and Americans harms not only Russia, but also Germany.
The third reason for the hatred of Nord Stream 2 really concerns Ukraine, more precisely, the financial support of the Ukrainian state project. In the Polish picture of the world, it is designed to restrain Russia and interfere with her life in every possible way, but with this approach, Ukraine is rapidly becoming poorer, since its geographical position and dependence on the Russian economy are irrevocable.
According to the logic of things, Poles, Americans, Germans and others should in this case take responsibility for feeding Ukraine on themselves, but no one has extra money, so the question is put like this: yes, Ukraine is an anti-Russian project, but Russia itself must provide it, primarily by paying for gas pumping through its territory.
Be that as it may, Moravetsky is right that the removal of the valve from Ukrainian hands will make it possible to do with Ukraine, if not everything that one wants, then much of what is risky to do now.
There is no “devilish trick” in this, solid business interests, and quite obvious ones. Natural gas is one of the main Russian commodities, guaranteeing foreign exchange receipts to the treasury. The state is directly interested in its uninterrupted sale to the EU countries and would like to eliminate the intermediary standing between it and the buyer, that is, Ukraine.
First of all, because it is an unpredictable and corrupt state, capable of any provocation. It has proved this with its entire history since 1991 and continues to prove it to this day.
But at the same time, it would be sly to say that, depriving Kiev of the weapon for gas blackmail, Russia thinks only of its obligations to European buyers. There are a number of problems in relations with Ukraine that we still have to solve – and they will be solved, sooner or later, one way or another.
For example, we need to achieve sustainable peace in Donbass, provide security guarantees for its residents and opportunities for economic development of the region. We need to provide Crimea with fresh water and finally close the issue of its belonging to the Russian Federation. This is, so to speak, an irrevocable minimum.
To do this, Ukraine will have to put pressure on, and not on political Kiev (practice shows that little depends on the name of the president, since the country’s policy is determined by passionate rural gopniks), but on Ukrainians in general – the provocative activities of their state in relation to Russia, Russians and Russian-speaking should be reflected in Ukrainian wallets. It is reflected, but while all this was happening in a sparing regime, we did not cut off the channels of financial support for an openly hostile country at our expense.
There are many such channels, starting with fairly large business and ending with the transfer of workers to their homeland, but as long as Kiev has the opportunity to dictate conditions to us on gas transportation issues, this set of methods is blocked for us. The risks are too high, and will remain high until the moment when Nord Stream 2 is fully operational.
And it will work. It won’t be long to wait.
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