During the recent session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Joint Security Agreement (CSTO), participants in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, effectively presented a type of “partner country” of the CSTO. Grant such status to a third country (Paodkb.org, Duma.gov.ru, 1st of July). Vyacheslav Volodin, spokesman for the Russian State Duma, announced that several states had already expressed interest in becoming “partners” in the coalition. And Leonid Kalashnikov, chairman of the Duma’s Eurasian Integration Committee Among other things Before taking a step back, Azerbaijan became a partner state: “It is not customary to talk about it.”RIA Novosti, 1st of July). In May, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko told Azerbaijan that “the doors of the CSTO are open” and that the lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia, a member of the organization, was a major obstacle.Isvestia, Mayo 24).
Currently, Moscow and Yerevan are discussing the deployment of Russian border guards to secure Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. In addition, Yerevan has again appealed to the CSDO to activate an article on collective defense against Baguio. However, CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Jazz responded that the coalition would only help in case of aggression.For Border incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Shake, 3rd of July). Although Yerevan was not satisfied with that answer (Kawkasky Ussel, July 7), the incident set a precedent for Baku: joining the organization would protect Azerbaijan from future CSTO involvement in the country and would become an implicit condition for facilitating the Kremlin’s “grand peace deal”. Azerbaijan wants to reach Armenia.
Such statements and gestures by Moscow effectively configure a strange reality in which Azerbaijan is ready or ready to join the CSTO, but Armenia stands in the way. So the next step is to materialize this strange reality by granting Azerbaijan partner or observer status, despite the objections of Armenia. In fact, Russian expert Alexander Berendziev predicts that the Armenian hurdle will be resolved to allow Azerbaijan to become an ally of the CSTO (Vzglyad, July 8). Similar gestures and appeals have been made in recent times to attract Azerbaijan to the Moscow-led coalition (see EDM, July 22, 2020).
But now, the situation is exacerbated after the Second Karabakh War (September 27 to November 9, 2020), in which Turkey formally confirmed its presence in Azerbaijan by signing its presence in Azerbaijan on June 15 (see EDM, June 23, 2020). ). He also said that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had discussed the creation of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, and that Aliyev would hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Erdogan also said that Turkey wants to involve Azerbaijan and its state energy company SOCAR in hydrocarbon extraction projects in Libya.Tccb.gov.tr, June, 15; Sozcu.com.tr, June 17). Following the withdrawal of the United States and most of its western allies from Afghanistan, the Azerbaijani military is said to join Turkey’s ongoing peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. All three problems indicate that Ankara seeks to use Baku in a supporting role in Turkey’s geopolitical drama. However, there is a question mark as to whether Ankara’s intentions really coincide with Bagu’s interests. Powers such as the former Soviet Union and the United States have “ended in humiliating defeat” (an Azerbaijani member of parliament recently warned the government of the danger of being trapped in Afghanistan.Aspolitica.as, 1st of July). But the problem is whether Azerbaijan can deny Turkey, as this is Baku’s method, at least in Ankara’s view, to reconsider what is described as fraternal gestures (Qaynarinfo.az, July 9th).
Turkey’s presence in the South Caucasus and the march through Afghanistan to Central Asia following the US withdrawal are, in Russia’s view, the so-called “anaconda ring” conspiracy theory, which is deeply rooted in the Russian psyche. Consequently, the American-led Western world aims to surround Russia with hostile nations and conflict.Posredi.ru, June 21; Euvsdisinfo.eu, Accessed July 15). Recent article in the Armenian Service Sputnik News Turkey’s actions near Russia have been cited as evidence of the “western anaconda ring on the Turkish bottle” (Armeniasputnik.M, June 30th).
Therefore, Moscow feels pressure to confront the growing Turkish presence in Azerbaijan. In fact, earlier this year, Moscow expressed its desire to join the Turkish-speaking Cooperation Council (informally, the Turkish Council). Although the membership requires a majority of the Turkish population, the Russian Federation actually surpasses most Turkish countries (except Turkey and Uzbekistan) in terms of the fully integrated size of its multi-ethnic Turkish population. Moscow’s drive to infiltrate the Turkish Council shows an interest in balancing Ankara’s hegemony over the organization and its growing popularity among Russia’s millions of powerful Turkish-speaking minorities (see EDM, October 30, 2019 and June 28 from 2021; Politicstode.R, May 20, 2021; News.ru, May 21, 2021; Bizimyolinfo.az, May 23, 2021).
Paradoxically, Russian attempts to join the Turkish Council or engage other Turkish countries through the CSDO or the EU to give Turkey the opposite weight are often cited as evidence of the growing Russian-Turkish regional alliance. In this perspective, Turkey and Russia are said to be the key countries of a union between the Turkish and Slavic (Eastern) civilizations under the Eurasian idea. By the way, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are simultaneously members of the Council of Turkey, the CSTO and the EU. Even before the outbreak of the Second Karabakh War, but after the outbreak of the “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia, Alexander Dukin, a prominent Russian supporter of Eurasianism, repeatedly (though not globally) Providence, July 8, 2019 ) “Putin’s Rasputin” or Kremlin ideologue: visit the village of Jojuk Morozli, one of the places of Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2016 conflict with Armenia in July 2018. There, Dukin said that Armenia should “give back the five occupied districts ”and that“ the Russian Federation recognizes Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan ”. Assuming Dugin’s connections to the Kremlin weren’t exaggerated, his comments may have been intended to point to Baku Moscow’s relative neutrality and the red lines before the Second Karabakh War. Perhaps most importantly, Dukin specifically noted that “the idea of Eurasia is impossible without an alliance of Turkish and Slavic countries” (Avsia.As, July 1, 2018; Geopolitica.ru, July 1, 8, 2018). Therefore, Russia’s maneuvers with regard to Azerbaijan and its motivated approach to Turkey appear to have been dictated by the dichotomy of the “Project Anaconda” conspiracy and Eurasian ideology.