U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance has returned from Pakistan without achieving a settlement regarding the war with Iran, leading to calls for a fundamental overhaul of Israeli nuclear strategy to counter regional instability and proliferation.
- Strategic Shift: Experts suggest Israel end its policy of nuclear ambiguity in favor of “selective nuclear disclosure” to enhance deterrence.
- Broadened Threats: Nuclear risks are identified not only in Iran but potentially through “replacement enemies” such as Egypt, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia.
- Operational Framework: A proposed four-part doctrine covers nuclear retaliation, counter-retaliation, preemption, and war fighting.
Challenges to Regional Stability
The failure to secure a settlement in Pakistan highlights continuing nuclear dangers from Iran and the potential for further regional destabilization. Analysts warn that even a favorable conclusion to current conflicts could result in new configurations of enemies.
Beyond Iran, there is a risk that states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt could create new nuclear threats. Additionally, Jihadi terrorist groups could serve as force-multiplying surrogates for these adversaries.
To address these threats, strategic planners argue that Jerusalem must move away from “seat-of-the-pants” policies and intra-crisis hyperbole, focusing instead on comprehensive theorizing and science-based inquiry.
The Case for Ending Nuclear Ambiguity
A central recommendation for strengthening Israeli nuclear strategy is the abandonment of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.” By removing the “bomb from the basement” through selective disclosure, Israel could create a more credible deterrence posture.
The argument posits that the mere possession of nuclear forces is insufficient for deterrence. Instead, prospective aggressors must believe that Israel is willing to launch a measured nuclear retaliation and possesses forces capable of penetrating active air and missile defenses.
This approach emphasizes “assured destruction” over the rhetoric of “obliteration,” suggesting that the credibility of deterrence may actually vary inversely with the total destructiveness of the weapons used.
Four Narratives of Nuclear Conflict
Strategic planners have identified four primary narratives to guide nuclear preparedness:
Nuclear retaliation: Israel would respond with a nuclear strike following a nuclear first strike or the use of high-lethality biological weapons. Nuclear reprisal could also be considered following a massive conventional attack if it is perceived as a genocidal attempt to annihilate the Jewish state.
Nuclear counter-retaliation: If Israel preempts an enemy with conventional weapons and the enemy responds with nuclear weapons or other WMDs, Israel would likely move to nuclear counter-retaliation to maintain escalation dominance.
Nuclear preemption: Launching a preemptive nuclear strike is considered implausible for the foreseeable future. Such an action would likely only occur if an enemy had acquired WMDs capable of annihilation, showed a readiness to launch, and non-nuclear options were deemed incapable of preserving the state.
Nuclear war fighting: This scenario occurs if nuclear weapons are introduced into an active conflict and neither side’s second-strike or counter-retaliatory capabilities are fully destroyed.
Requirements for Effective Deterrence
To ensure survival, the proposed strategy emphasizes a counter-value targeted nuclear retaliatory force that is invulnerable to a first strike.
Maximizing this deterrence requires specific focus on the targeting, hardening, dispersion, multiplication, basing, and yield of military forces. The strategy advocates for a focus on deterrence ex ante rather than revenge ex post.
Finally, decision-makers in Jerusalem and Washington must develop the ability to distinguish between genuine and feigned irrationality in adversarial leadership to tailor their responses accordingly.
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