Inside the Mind of Dick Cheney: A Former Briefer’s Account

The interview was scheduled for a week from the day my left foot betrayed me. A misstep on the stairs, a frantic rush to the National Security Council, and suddenly, I was facing a meeting with the Vice President of the United States sporting a rather conspicuous purple cast. It felt… less than ideal. Yet, somehow, that ungainly cast became my unlikely introduction to a role briefing Dick Cheney, a position demanding competence and discretion.

The Daily Rhythm of Intelligence

During the Bush administration, the President and Vice President’s intelligence briefers operated on a relentless schedule. We began preparations around 1:00 AM each morning, crafting the President’s Daily Brief – known simply as “The Book.” This concise intelligence assessment, initially produced solely by the CIA, was distributed to a select group of policymakers. Beyond the brief itself, we provided accompanying analysis and responded to immediate requests. For the President and Vice President, these briefings were constant, often traveling with them six or even seven days a week.

My role with Cheney extended beyond the standard PDB. I had the latitude – and the responsibility – to curate a personalized intelligence stream for him. This included raw intelligence reports, relevant press coverage, summaries of books, and any other information I believed would be valuable. It was a judgment call, made without direct oversight, and one I took seriously.

A Man of Defined Boundaries

Briefings typically occurred at the Naval Observatory, the Vice President’s official residence. However, my immersion into Cheney’s world truly began with a trip to Camp David just a week into the job. This rapid exposure offered a crucial learning curve, revealing a man who categorized people with striking clarity. There was little ambiguity; individuals were either respected or they were not. This wasn’t based on social standing, but on how they carried themselves and their interactions.

The residence staff consistently spoke of the Cheneys with genuine fondness, noting a level of respect rarely extended by previous administrations. They appreciated the consideration given to their time and demands. Conversely, incidents like the infamous exchange with Senator Patrick Leahy in 2004 demonstrated Cheney’s willingness to express his opinions, bluntly and without reservation. He rarely equivocated.

Cheney’s Intellectual Rigor and the Iraq War

Cheney consistently dedicated more time to PDB sessions than any other recipient in the administration. These weren’t cursory reviews; they were in-depth discussions fueled by his voracious reading and decades of experience in government and geopolitics. My briefings often lasted at least 30 minutes, frequently extending beyond 90 when the President’s schedule allowed. This commitment underscored a fundamental truth: Dick Cheney was an exceptional overachiever, meticulously prepared for any challenge.

My tenure briefing Cheney coincided with the lead-up to and aftermath of the Iraq War. Having subsequently led the CIA’s Iraq enterprise – encompassing military, political, leadership, and economic analysis – I possess a unique perspective on this pivotal period. What I observed during NSC meetings, often attending as a proxy for the CIA Director or Director of National Intelligence, challenged conventional narratives.

Cheney’s initial assessment, publicly stated on NBC’s Meet the Press in March 2002, predicted a swift and welcoming reception in Iraq: “I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq… my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators… I think it [the invasion] will go relatively quickly… weeks rather than months.” History, of course, proved him profoundly wrong.

Recognizing the Insurgency

Shortly after the invasion in March 2003, violence escalated, and my CIA team delivered a stark assessment to President Bush and Cheney: an insurgency was taking root. Initially, the administration attributed the unrest to “criminals, regime dead-enders, or trouble-makers.” However, we argued, in a PDB presented to the Oval Office, that a well-organized, indigenous insurgency was rapidly developing. The President’s reaction was reportedly explosive: “He was so angry he came off his chair. He wants a memo tomorrow morning recounting when we warned him this was coming.”

Remarkably, Cheney, a staunch advocate for the invasion, became a key voice in persuading Bush to acknowledge the reality of the insurgency. He understood the political fallout – the inevitable criticism – but prioritized aligning policy with the facts on the ground. He told us directly, “The President needs to hear this.”

A pivotal moment occurred during a briefing to the NSC a few days before Veterans Day in 2003. I was slated to lead the presentation, facilitated by Cheney, but recognizing potential pushback on the details of our analysis, I delegated to two of my most skilled analysts: a military expert and a political analyst. It was the military analyst who ultimately convinced Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and others, of the insurgency’s emergence, skillfully dissecting differing definitions and demonstrating the CIA’s conclusion aligned with the Department of Defense’s own criteria. Bush accepted the assessment, requesting that the term “insurgency” be avoided in public statements.

What drove Cheney’s unwavering focus on Iraq, even in the face of mounting evidence challenging the initial rationale for the invasion? One morning, after a PDB briefing, he recounted his experience as Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War. He recalled learning, through interrogations of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, that Iraq’s nuclear program was further advanced than previously assessed. This wasn’t a reprimand for past intelligence failures; it was a revelation of the weight he carried, the profound responsibility he felt to prevent another catastrophic outcome. As The Economist noted in his obituary, Cheney was “just doing his job. Trying to protect America.”

What lessons can current policymakers draw from the experiences in Iraq and the decision-making processes of the Bush administration?

How does the need for accurate intelligence assessment balance with the political pressures of wartime decision-making?

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