Protests that began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on Dec. 28, 2025, have expanded into a nationwide challenge to the Iranian government, met with a violent crackdown in which more than 6,000 protesters have reportedly been killed. The unrest has broadened to include ethnic minority groups, raising questions about the future of the country and the concept of change within Iran.
Initial Response and Escalation
Initially, the government treated the protests as manageable and temporary. Bazaar merchants, historically a conservative group closely connected to the state’s economic structure, were believed to be seeking to stabilize the collapsing currency and curb inflation threatening their livelihoods. In an unprecedented move, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei openly acknowledged the merchants’ protests – the first time he had accepted the legitimacy of any demonstration.
However, the protests quickly spread to over 25 provinces, developing into a nationwide challenge. This escalation was met with a violent crackdown, resulting in a significant number of reported fatalities.
The Role of Ethnic Minorities
Iran, with a population of about 93 million, is comprised of a diverse range of ethnic groups. While 51% identify as Persian, 24% are Azeri, and Kurds constitute roughly 8% to 17% of the population. Arabs and Baluch minorities represent 3% and 2% respectively.
Successive Iranian governments have treated ethnic diversity as a security challenge, suppressing demands for political inclusion and language rights. Initially, minority regions were less prominent in the current protests than in the 2022–23 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising. However, unrest has expanded to include these groups.
Protests Erupt in Kurdish and Baluchestan Regions
The Kurdish involvement began in the city of Malekshahi in Ilam province on Jan. 3, following a violent raid by security forces on wounded protesters in a local hospital. Protests continued in Ilam and erupted in nearby Kermanshah province, driven by economic deprivation and political discrimination.
Kurdish political parties issued a joint statement calling for a region-wide strike. Unlike the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, where Kurdish cities were treated as security zones, Kurdish leaders opted for strikes to demonstrate solidarity while reducing the risk of further violence.
Baluchestan, in Iran’s southeast, followed Kurdistan, with protests erupting after Friday prayers on Jan. 9, driven by long-standing ethnic and religious marginalization.
Cautious Involvement in Iranian Azerbaijan
Iranian Azerbaijan, in the country’s northwest, joined the protests later and more cautiously. This reflects the Azerbaijanis’ current favorable position within Iran’s political, military, and economic institutions. Historically, Shiite Azari-Turks dominated the Iranian state, with Azerbaijani functioning as a court language, a status curtailed by the Pahlavi monarchy but partially restored by the Islamic Republic.
A History of Repression and Emerging Demands
Ethnically based political movements emerged after the 1979 revolution, but were quickly suppressed. Kurdistan was an exception, where resistance and violence continued for several years. This repression, coupled with the Iran–Iraq War, muted ethnic minority demands for a period.
The current protests reveal a fundamental divide over the meaning of political change. While many Persian-majority urban protesters seek social freedoms and economic recovery, ethnic communities carry additional demands: decentralization of power, recognition of linguistic and cultural rights, and genuine power-sharing within the state.
For decades, ethnic minority demands have been labeled as separatist or “terrorist” by the Islamic Republic.
Concerns Regarding the Opposition Leadership
Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah of Iran, is positioning himself as a leader of the opposition. However, his published road map for a transitional government has raised concerns among ethnic communities, as it characterizes ethnic-based demands as threats to national security, reinforcing long-standing state narratives.
For communities historically marginalized during the Pahlavi monarchy, the resurgence of monarchist slogans reinforces fears that any transition driven by centralized narratives will again lead to their marginalization.
Any future transition, whether through reform or regime change, will require a political framework that acknowledges and incorporates the demands of all regions and communities to build a durable political order.
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