Iran Protests & Russia: A Shifting Middle East Order

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Russia has largely remained on the sidelines as conflict escalates in Iran, offering diplomatic condemnation but limited material assistance despite a strategic partnership treaty with Tehran. While Moscow has deepened ties with Iran since its invasion of Ukraine, its ability and willingness to protect its partners remain constrained by its own military commitments and geopolitical considerations.

A Marriage of Convenience

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Tehran found common ground in developing a partnership. For centuries prior, they were rivals competing for influence in the Caucasus region and around the Caspian Sea. However, in the early 1990s, Moscow sought to sell surplus Soviet-era defense and civilian nuclear technologies, and Iran, weakened by its war with Iraq and facing Western sanctions, became a willing buyer.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia supplied Iran with core components of its military inventory, including MiG-29 fighters, Su-24 strike aircraft, Kilo-class diesel submarines, T-72 tanks, and S-200 air defense systems. Later additions included Tor-M1 short-range air defense batteries and the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system. Despite these deliveries, the relationship never reached full alliance-level military integration, as Russian arms transfers were limited by Western sanctions and did not include its most advanced systems.

Russia also maintained security relationships with Egypt, Israel, and Gulf states—all competitors or adversaries of Iran—a fact not lost on Iranian officials, who harbored resentment. In 2010, Moscow suspended deliveries of the S-300 system to Iran and supported UN sanctions, prioritizing its standing with the United States and the European Union.

Cooperation in the oil and gas sector, the foundation of both economies, has yielded little success. While Russian oil companies explored opportunities in Iran, no significant deals were concluded. Trade volumes between the two countries remained low, ranging from $1 billion to $3 billion annually, with Russia primarily exporting grain and nuclear fuel, and Iran exporting fruits, vegetables, and nuts.

The civil war in Syria in 2015 brought Russia and Iran into a tactical alliance, with Moscow providing air support and Tehran bolstering pro-regime forces with military advisors and support from Hezbollah. However, the relationship truly evolved after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ties That Bind

After 2022, the Kremlin sought partners willing to support its military campaign against Kyiv, help evade sanctions, and provide means of pressure against the Western coalition supporting Ukraine. Iran met these criteria, becoming Russia’s primary partner in the Middle East, even at the cost of strained ties with Israel.

The war in Ukraine reversed the dynamic of the Iranian-Russian security relationship. Iran became a net supplier of arms to Russia, most notably the Shahed series of loitering munitions, which Russian forces began deploying in the autumn of 2022. Russia quickly began domestic production of the Shahed, adapting components to circumvent supply chain issues and sanctions.

In return, Russia reportedly provided Iran with military hardware, including Yak-130 trainer jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters, Spartak armored vehicles, and small arms. Iran has also contracted to buy Su-35 fighter jets and portable air defense systems, though their delivery status remains unclear. Security cooperation also extends to space, with Russian infrastructure and expertise aiding Iranian ballistic missile development.

Iran also assisted Russia in mitigating the impact of Western sanctions. Having developed a “shadow fleet” of tankers to circumvent sanctions on its own oil exports, Iran shared this infrastructure with Russia, enabling Moscow to expand its illicit oil trade, primarily to China and India.

Trade between Russia and Iran has more than doubled since the start of the war in Ukraine, rising from around $2 billion to nearly $5 billion annually. Russia also secured Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the expanded BRICS group, and brokered a free-trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union. Moscow has also shown willingness to engage with Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis, providing training and weapons.

Cashing In

Despite the deepening relationship, Russia’s ability to protect Iran remains limited. While Iran desires advanced fighters, air defense systems, and precision munitions from Russia, Moscow’s own war in Ukraine restricts its capacity to deliver. Training Iranian operators on systems like the S-400 air defense system alone would take six to eight months.

With its military preoccupied in Ukraine, Moscow has offered Tehran little beyond diplomatic condemnation and calls for restraint. Ongoing negotiations with the Trump administration to end the war in Ukraine also constrain Moscow’s willingness to provide stronger support to Iran, as does the need to maintain relationships with Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Russia may be providing assistance that is difficult to detect, such as access to space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. However, the impact of such assistance pales in comparison to the intelligence support provided to Ukraine by the United States.

Russia stands to benefit from the unintended consequences of the conflict in Iran. The United States is expending air defense interceptors and precision munitions that Ukraine needs, and rising energy prices will boost Russian oil and gas revenues. The U.S. Treasury Department recently issued a temporary license allowing the sale of Russian crude oil already at sea to India in an effort to stabilize prices.

A prolonged disruption to energy supplies from the Gulf could also persuade China to pursue overland oil and gas pipelines from Russia, a goal Putin has sought for a decade. Higher energy prices would make Russian oil and gas indispensable, potentially forcing a reassessment of sanctions policies by European and U.S. policymakers.

Russia’s failures to support its partners in Syria, Venezuela, and Iran highlight the limitations of its global power. With its resources tied down in Ukraine, Moscow can offer little material help to its allies, focusing instead on capitalizing on the unintended consequences of U.S. interventionism.


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