Prabowo’s Indonesia: China, Power & Food Security

Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto is consolidating executive authority and pursuing a more active foreign policy, marked by a tilt toward China, according to recent analysis. This shift is characterized by increased military involvement in civilian affairs and a willingness to circumvent bureaucratic constraints in pursuit of national goals.

The Indonesia-China Relationship

Indonesia and China have increased high-level engagements under Prabowo’s tenure, including his attendance at the commemoration of China’s victory over Japan during WWII. In April, Indonesia became the first country to be a 2+2 dialogue partner of China, with both countries vowing to expand military-to-military cooperation.

Prabowo has repeatedly stated his admiration for former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s transformation of China into an economic powerhouse, hoping to bring about Indonesia’s own economic miracle. China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching USD 135 billion and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) totaling USD 8.1 billion in 2024.

Foreign Policy Shift

Prabowo’s presidency has diverged significantly from that of his predecessor, Joko Widodo, who focused on domestic issues and economic improvement, leading some to dub Prabowo the “foreign policy president.” He has sought to mold Indonesia into a more active player on the global stage, with reforms in civil-military fusion advancing his agenda.

Prabowo initiated his term with diplomatic outreach to both Beijing and Washington, followed by a Middle East tour and alliance-building in Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands. He concluded 2025 with engagements in Australia and Russia.

Indonesia joined BRICS weeks after Prabowo’s inauguration, and increased its engagement with China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) under the newly introduced SCO Plus format.

Domestic Consolidation of Power

The meal program (MBG) led by the TNI exemplifies a broader pattern of executive authority consolidation under the Prabowo administration. The military’s swift mobilization reflects its institutional capacity and societal acceptance of its role in civilian affairs, rooted in Indonesia’s strategic culture.

Prabowo has consolidated power by reducing civilian constraints, such as marginalizing civil society groups, and surrounding himself with military loyalists in an increasingly militarized bureaucracy. This allows him to expand the presidency’s role in directly shaping foreign policy and compensate for civilian institutional shortcomings and a lack of public trust.

Indonesia’s civilian government has a reputation for corruption and poorly implemented policies, resulting in a public preference for the TNI and President Prabowo.

Limits to the Shift

Despite the growing relationship, there are limits to Prabowo’s ability to move closer to China. His comments on the North Natuna Sea, stating that “the two sides reached an important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims,” undermined Indonesia’s claims of sole legal authority over the area and required officials to walk back his statement.

A runway at Morowali Industrial Park, a major hub for Indonesia’s nickel industry, became a domestic scandal due to Chinese semi-autonomous activity through a clandestine airstrip, highlighting persistent sovereignty issues and the complicated history between Indonesians and ethnic Chinese Indonesians.

Prabowo views China as an indispensable economic partner and has seen how the country has developed through state-led growth, while maintaining social cohesion through rigorous top-down governance. However, Indonesia also applied to join the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in June 2025 and signed the Australia-Indonesia Treaty of Common Security in February 2026, indicating a desire to remain connected to both China and the West.