Thailand’s annual military reshuffles, which took effect on October 1, 2025, reflect the continued significance of royalist affiliations, pre-cadet class membership, and established military factionalism, despite occurring under a nominally civilian-led government.
Executive Summary
- Thailand’s annual military reshuffles, which took effect on October 1, 2025, once again reflected the significance of royalist affiliations, pre-cadet class membership, shared military unit factionalism, and connections with military or political personages.
- In particular, Thailand’s military appointments reflect the increased dominance of Army Commander General Pana Khlaeoplodtuk and his pre-cadet class 26 as well as the continuing influence of former military strongmen General Apirat Kongsompong of the Wongthewan faction and General Prayut Chan-o-cha of Buraphaphayak faction.
- Although less pronounced, several other military figures and conservative political actors also exerted influence over the latest reshuffles, underscoring the persistence of overlapping patronage networks across Thailand’s security establishment.
- While it was the Pheu Thai-led civilian government that formally submitted the reshuffles for royal endorsement, it refrained from challenging the military’s preferences regarding these reshuffles.
- As usual, reshuffle decisions align with the preferences of senior advisors to the palace.
This study examines Thailand’s 2025 annual armed forces reshuffles, arguing that they underscore the persistence of autonomous military power and the consolidation of military dominance. The Pheu Thai government, indirectly controlled by ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, proved unable to curb military autonomy.
Two developments in mid-2025 shifted the balance of authority in favour of the military. First, a leaked June phone call between Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen and former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra led to her dismissal as Prime Minister by the Constitutional Court. Second, armed hostilities along the Thai-Cambodian border in July provided the military with a pretext to assert its authority, further undermining civilian leadership. These events eroded civilian legitimacy and enabled the armed forces to consolidate control over appointments without interference.
The 1 October 2025 reshuffles confirm these trends, specifically the military’s continued ability to disregard civilian preferences and reduce civilian oversight to a formality. They also strengthened the influence of key army factions, notably Wongthewan (Divine Progeny) and Buraphapayak (Eastern Tigers), both operating under the palace-created Kho Daeng (Red Rim) clique.
The Impact of the 2008 Modification to the Defence Act
Since the 2008 modification of the Defence Act, Thailand’s military has maintained decisive control over its internal reshuffles, leaving political parties and elected governments with little practical influence. Although parties maintain symbolic linkages with retired military officials, these connections have not translated into the ability to shape promotions or appointments.
The 2008 modification formalised the military’s autonomy from elected governments during a period of tension between the armed forces and pro-Thaksin political parties. Under the revised Act, senior military appointments are decided by a seven-member vetting board, with only two members coming from the elected government and five representing the military establishment. Any attempt to dissolve this vetting board would likely provoke resistance from the military and even the palace.
Determining Reshuffles
In the absence of civilian oversight, Thailand’s military reshuffles follow informal criteria, with demonstrated fealty to the palace serving as a key criterion for advancement. However, factional affiliations, pre-cadet class bonds, and personal connections also play a role.
The Role of Military Factions
Military factions have long structured competition for promotion, often organised around shared educational cohorts and service units. The most significant lineage stems from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS), established in 1958. Shared class membership in AFAPS forms the backbone of Thailand’s officer networks.
The oldest and most prestigious faction is Wongthewan (“Divine Progeny”), founded in 1870 and centred on the 1st Army infantry regiment and division. Another powerful clique is Buraphapayak (“Eastern Tigers”), representing the 2nd infantry division.
These networks have shaped every coup in modern Thai history. Members of Special Forces and Wongthewan led the 1991 coup; Special Forces and Buraphapayak led the 2006 coup; and Buraphapayak and Wongthewan jointly orchestrated the 2014 coup.
The Red Rim Experiment and Its Reversal
In 2018, individuals close to the current monarch sought to unify the upper echelons of the armed forces under a single royalist identity with the Kho Daeng (“Red Rim”) faction. However, this effort bred resentment and divisions. In late 2024, the order to phase out Red Rims signaled a return to older patterns of factional balance.
Personal Networks and the Rise of General Pana
Personal and kin connections also matter in reshuffles. Army Commander General Pana, a member of the Wongthewan faction, has used his position to place members of his pre-cadet class 26 in strategic positions.
What’s New in 2025?
The 2025 military reshuffle involved top-heavy promotions of generals.
Table 1: The 2025 Military Reshuffle
| Appointments | 862 (up 54 from 808 in 2024) | Including 23 females (same in 2024, five less than in 2023) |
| Generals or Generals-Equivalent | 482 | |
| Colonels or Colonels-Equivalent | 380 |
Source: Thai PBS, “นายทหารรับราชการ,”September 4, 2025, https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/356205#:~:text=โปรดเกล้าฯ%20%20แต่งตั้ง%20862%20นายทหาร%20%2D%20เปิดชื่อ%20ผบ.เหล่าทัพ.
Table 2: 2024-2025 Promotions to General
| Year | Numbers | From Lower-Level Generals | From Colonels |
| 2024 | 588 | 267 | 321 |
| 2025 | 639 | 303 | 336 |
Source: Matichon, มีพระบรมราชโองการ โปรดเกล้าฯ พระราชทานยศทหารชั้นนายพล 639 ราย,” September 5, 2025, https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_5355415.
Table 3: Number of Actual Generals in 2022 Irrespective of Reshuffle
| Types of Generals | Actual Number of Generals | Number of Generals Filling Positions |
| Generals (Special) | 23 | 21 |
| Generals | 155 | 93 |
| Lieutenant Generals | 434 | 302 |
| Major Generals | 1329 | 971 |
| Total | 1,941 | 1,387 |
Source: Rocket Media Lab, “กลาโหมมีนายพลเท่าไหร่,” February 12, 2025,
Defence Ministry and Security Services as a Whole
The 2025 reshuffle reinforced the dominance of archroyalist officers across the Defence Ministry and security services. The six topmost personnel of the Defence Ministry and the five senior officers of the security services are all highly trusted by those close to the palace.
Under the Anutin government, the Defence Ministry is overseen by Prayut-loyalist General Nattapol Nakpanich. Deputy Defence Minister General Adul Boonthamcharoen is a member of pre-cadet class 26. Permanent Defence Minister General Tharapong Malakam hails from the Buraphapayak faction.
Table 4: Key figures in the Security Services, 2025-2026. (Asterisks indicate new appointments)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Defence Minister | General Nattapol Nakpanich* | Wongthewan/Apirat/Prayut | 20/Apirat/ Prayut | Retired |
| Deputy Defence Minister | Gen. Adul* Boonthamcharoen | Pana, Boonsin, Newin, Anutin | 26 | Retired |
| Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | General Tharapong Malakam* | Regiment 2/Prawit/Burapha Phayak/Kho Khieow | 24 | 2026 |
| Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | General Wasu Jiamsuk* | former aide to Prayut | 25 | 2027 |
| Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | Admiral Nattapol Dieowanit* | Missed out on appointment to Navy Commander, a favorite of former Navy Commander Adung | 25 | 2026 |
| Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | Air Chief Marshal Suchart Teparak* | Son of deputy transport minister and royal guard | 25 | 2026 |
| Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence | General Surin Prianupap* | Responsible for A=frmy-owned Lumpini Boxing Stadium | 25 | 2026 |
| Commander, Royal Armed Forces Headquarters | Gen. Ukrit Boontanon* | Kho Kieow (Green Rim)/Army Operations Department | 24 | 2027 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Army | General Pana Klaewplaudtuk | Wongthewan/Kho Daeng/Apirat/ Narongphan | 26 | 2027 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Navy | Admiral Pairoj Fuengchan* | Choice of previous Navy Commander arch-royalist Adm. Jirapol Wongwit | 24 | 2026 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Air Force | Seksan Kanta* | Western-oriented, Swedish Gripen, Attache, UK England, close to former Air Force Commander Panphakdi Pattanakul | 26 | 2028 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Police | Police General Kittirat Phanpet | Palace, Suwat Jaengyodsuk, Patcharawat Wongsuwan and Captain Thamanat Prompow | 25/41 | 2027 |
Conclusion
The September 2025 ascension of the Anutin-led civilian Bhumjaithai government occurred shortly after the Pheu Thai-led government sent the military reshuffle to the palace for endorsement. The appointments had already been determined by military service chiefs, and acting Prime Minister Phumtham simply rubber-stamped them. Overseeing these decisions were retired military strongmen Prayut, Apirat, and Narongphan, as well as Defence Minister Nattapol and Army Commander Pana, demonstrating the continued influence of senior military figures.
The patterns observed in appointments and promotions confirm that civilian supremacy over the armed forces has not been achieved, and that military factional networks, pre-cadet class loyalty, and palace endorsement continue to dominate. Thailand’s military remains effectively autonomous from civilian governments, answering only to the palace. Political parties have shown little resistance, leaving the military able to bypass the executive and legislative branches with relative ease.
Factional dynamics and the influence of key military personages continue to shape military appointments despite the overarching salience of palace endorsement. Wongthewan currently dominates, while Buraphapayak retains several top army postings. Army Commander Pana’s pre-cadet class 26 benefited the most from reshuffle decisions. Pana will probably continue to promote his associates in the 2026 reshuffle.
Succession planning is largely guided by Pana until his retirement in 2027. The 1st Army Region Commander, General Worayot, is likely to succeed Pana as Army Commander.
Under the Anutin government, the military enjoys greater autonomy than under Pheu Thai. This suggests that the trend of military dominance is likely to continue, with Thailand’s military remaining almost completely unaccountable, opaque to civilian oversight, and prepared to intervene in politics when necessary.
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