Indonesia’s Middle Power Choice: Defining Its Swing State Role

Indonesia is navigating its role as an emerging power in the Indo-Pacific region, with analysts suggesting a strategic shift towards a selective “swing state” posture could maximize its influence. The country currently balances its independent foreign policy and leadership within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) while engaging with both the United States and China.

From Middle Power to Swing State

Indonesia is often characterized as an emerging middle power, possessing the potential to shape regional outcomes. However, its specific role, particularly whether to act as a regional “swing state,” remains undefined. This uncertainty presents both risks and opportunities for Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy principles.

A middle power is defined not by size or GDP, but by its ability to influence regional events through diplomacy and agenda-setting. “Swing state,” a term originating in electoral politics, is adapted here to describe a nation whose position on key issues can alter the balance between competing coalitions.

Indonesia already exhibits several middle-power characteristics, including its strategic location at the maritime crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, its chairing of key regional forums, its promotion of ASEAN centrality, and its balancing act between the U.S. and China. However, Jakarta has yet to clearly define its ambitions as an activist middle power or identify specific areas where it would act as a “swing state.” Some observers suggest Indonesia risks simply mirroring the preferences of larger powers.

Three Strategic Paths

Indonesia faces three potential strategic options regarding its positioning in the Indo-Pacific. The first is to maintain its current ambiguous middle-power posture, emphasizing its independent and active foreign policy and non-alignment. While this maximizes flexibility, it may also limit bargaining power and be perceived as weakness.

The second option involves adopting a selective “swing state” posture within its broader middle-power identity. Indonesia would focus on key areas like regional crisis control, maritime security, and strategic autonomy, consciously acting as a swing state. This approach could consolidate its image as a problem solver, but requires careful consideration of which issues to prioritize.

The third option is to fully embrace a “swing state” identity across the Indo-Pacific agenda. This could maximize Indonesia’s reputation and influence, but also carries significant risks, including high expectations and potential criticism if mediation efforts fail. Larger countries might also view Indonesia’s position as merely a bargaining chip.

A Selective Swing State for the Indo-Pacific and the Global South

A modified version of the second option – a selective “swing state” posture – is considered the most sustainable path. This allows Indonesia to address the realities of competition in the Indo-Pacific while leveraging its existing strengths. Indonesia’s 2022 G20 presidency, including hosting leaders from Western nations and Russia during the Ukraine conflict, demonstrated this potential, using its convening power to maintain communication channels.

This role extends beyond national interests, contributing to a more stable and inclusive regional order and supporting the wider Global South. A selective approach would allow Jakarta to broker compromises in areas like critical supply chains, digital governance, and climate finance, creating space for non-aligned and developing countries. Indonesia’s historical role in articulating the Bandung Spirit offers a relevant precedent for navigating competing alliances without becoming a subordinate of either side.