Iran: US Options Diminish – A Looming Crisis?

Three weeks into the joint U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, a pattern of strategic challenges similar to past American military engagements is emerging, despite the current conflict differing from those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam in its limited use of U.S. ground forces.

No Victory in Sight

The American war effort has been defined by strategic incoherence from the outset. President Donald Trump launched military operations without preparing the American public or articulating clear objectives, initially calling for the Iranian people to overthrow their government – effectively setting regime change as the goal. This established a high, and likely unattainable, standard for success.

Early developments suggest that actions by the United States and Israel have consolidated hard-line control within Iran. The deaths of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top officials have presented challenges for the regime, but there are few indications of security forces standing down or turning against their commanders. Iran’s war effort remains coherent, demonstrating clear command and control structures.

The killing of Khamenei may have made it harder to loosen the regime’s grip on the country. Prior to the war, analysts believed his eventual death could open space for internal recalibration, potentially leading to more pragmatic leadership focused on improving Iran’s economic position. That possibility has now likely been foreclosed.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Supreme Leader, is now the supreme leader. He is a hard-liner with close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and his appointment guarantees entrenchment of the current regime.

While regime change appears less likely in the near term, some proponents of the joint U.S.-Israeli campaign believe it can still succeed in neutering Iran as a military threat. The U.S. military has emphasized more limited objectives, focusing on degrading Iran’s military capabilities, including missile forces, naval assets, and the nuclear program, as well as Tehran’s ability to arm regional proxies. This framing is more realistic than Trump’s initial bid for regime change, but echoes challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To succeed, Washington and its partners must ensure the free flow of energy, protect critical infrastructure, and maintain regional stability. For Tehran, success may mean periodically attacking tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, striking energy facilities in the Gulf, or launching missile attacks that penetrate defenses. Even if most attacks are intercepted, the remaining ten percent can have significant economic and psychological effects.

Escalation Traps

Faced with this dynamic, the United States may be tempted to escalate to more dramatically set back the nuclear program or compel Iran to cease attacks. Options include seizing Iran’s highly enriched uranium stored in tunnels in Isfahan, but this would be a complex and dangerous operation, requiring U.S. forces to operate deep inside hostile territory.

Another option is seizing Kharg Island, through which roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports flow. While potentially achievable through an amphibious or airborne assault, this would require a major military operation and could significantly damage Iran’s oil infrastructure, driving global prices higher.

It is unclear what taking the island would achieve strategically, as the regime has demonstrated a willingness to absorb severe economic pain. Iran has also demonstrated an acute awareness of U.S. sensitivity to oil prices.

Intensifying efforts to destabilize the regime from within by arming and supporting internal opposition groups is another potential escalation. However, this carries the risk of fragmentation and civil war, potentially drawing in external actors like Turkey and Pakistan, and creating a chaotic environment.

The Case for a Limited Exit

Three weeks into the war, the United States faces a choice: continue escalating or recalibrate and seek a way out. The most prudent course is the latter. Trump should declare that the U.S. military has substantially achieved its limited objectives and signal a willingness to halt further escalation, while also assuring that the United States will rein in Israel and support future attacks on Iran only if Tehran restarts its nuclear program or strikes regional partners.

Iran may initially reject such an offer, but a U.S. posture oriented toward de-escalation could shift international pressure onto Tehran. Key global actors, including China, Europe, and Gulf states, would have incentives to push for an end to the conflict.

Accepting an uncomfortable truth is necessary: in wars such as this one, the most responsible course is not to press forward in search of a win but to recognize when the costs outweigh the gains—and to step back before a limited conflict becomes an engulfing quagmire.