Russia-Ukraine War: Europe’s Risk of Escalation

A new report from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) outlines recommendations for deterring Russia’s ongoing “shadow war” against the West, arguing current approaches have been hampered by misclassification, slow response times, and fear of escalation.

Why Previous Attempts Have Failed

Shadow warfare is consistently misclassified, leading to fragmented responses. Actions like cable disruptions are often treated as maritime accidents and cyber intrusions as technical incidents, rather than coordinated hostile acts.

The speed of Western responses consistently lags behind the tempo of Russian attacks, which are designed to be fast, deniable, and iterative. By the time attribution is established and responses are considered, political urgency often diminishes.

Fear of escalating tensions has resulted in ambiguity, which inadvertently favors the aggressor. Restraint has raised Moscow’s risk tolerance, encouraging further actions.

Current deterrence strategies are overly reliant on courtroom standards of proof, a disadvantage for the West. Russia’s shadow warfare is designed to obscure legal certainty, and waiting for incontrovertible evidence allows Moscow to maintain the initiative.

What Must Change

Attribution for shadow warfare should be based on recognizing patterns of activity, not isolated incidents. Blame should focus on repeated operational signatures – methods, targets, timing, and intent – rather than treating each event as a separate criminal act.

Collective consultation among European allies should become routine in response to shadow aggression, triggering coordinated assessment and action when patterns of activity emerge.

Hybrid threats – including cyber-attacks, infrastructure disruption, drone incursions, and proxy violence – must be integrated into a single deterrence framework. Allies should align maritime, cyber, legal, intelligence, and military tools under a unified strategy.

Allies need a pre-defined “menu of consequences” designed for speed and predictability, including cyber and intelligence operations, action against supporting vessels and networks, economic measures, and support for Ukrainian defense.

The European Union and NATO should harmonize their capabilities and thresholds for action to avoid duplication and address vulnerabilities. NATO should lead on detection, defense, and military response, while the EU focuses on financial pressure, borders, law enforcement, and export controls.

Responses to shadow warfare should be led by national security institutions – militaries and intelligence services – rather than law enforcement agencies. Criminal investigations are still necessary, but should inform political and security decision-making for faster action.

Public-private coordination is crucial, as Russia’s shadow war targets privately owned systems. Governments should establish formal, legally mandated security partnerships with the private sector to improve threat detection, attribution, and resilience.

Allies must demonstrate resolve in the face of Russia’s escalatory rhetoric. Intimidation tactics are intended to paralyze decision-making, and clear red lines and collective resolve must be maintained.