The Erosion of Accountability: A Systemic Breakdown

On paper, the safeguards are clear. When the United States provides weapons to foreign governments, those governments pledge to use them for authorized purposes, maintain their security, and prevent their transfer to unauthorized parties. However, a recently published GAO report paints a starkly different picture, revealing a deeply flawed system riddled with inconsistencies and a lack of follow-through.

The State Department largely relies on Defense Department personnel stationed abroad to identify potential end-use violations – instances where weapons are misused or diverted. Since 2019, the Pentagon has flagged over 150 such incidents. Yet, the State Department has officially reported a mere three violations to Capitol Hill. This discrepancy raises serious questions about the thoroughness of investigations and the criteria used for reporting.

Experts are sounding the alarm. “It was really shocking to see how far the U.S. had fallen behind,” said Kathi Lynn Austin, executive director of the Conflict Awareness Project. “The number of potential incidents flagged was extraordinary. We are violating our law and not protecting our own security – at a time when there is so much volatility in the world.”

The core of the problem, according to the GAO, lies in a fundamental mismatch. Defense personnel are often the first to observe potential violations, but the State Department has failed to provide clear guidance on what constitutes a reportable incident, what thresholds should trigger an investigation, and what timelines should be followed. In many cases, the GAO found no record of any decision-making process regarding reporting requirements.

The Arms Export Control Act mandates notification to Congress when there’s evidence of a substantial violation concerning the purpose, transfer, or security of U.S.-supplied arms. Despite these low reporting thresholds, the State Department lacks formal procedures for documenting and sharing its assessments.

While the State Department has agreed with the GAO’s six recommendations – including providing concrete guidance to the Pentagon, standardizing investigations, and establishing clear reporting procedures – the effectiveness of these changes hinges on voluntary compliance. The GAO lacks the authority to enforce its recommendations, leaving Congress potentially “flying blind” when it comes to the impact of U.S. arms sales on national and international security.

The Misuse Pipeline: From Legal Sale to Illicit Battlefield

The concept of “end-use” monitoring may sound bureaucratic, but the consequences of its failure are anything but. U.S.-made weapons routinely transition from legitimate sales to illicit use, falling into the hands of unintended recipients through theft, corruption, transfers to proxy forces, or simple loss.

The repercussions are widespread. In Afghanistan, for example, a vast quantity of U.S.-supplied weaponry flooded regional black markets following the Taliban’s takeover. Conflict Armament Research has traced ammunition used by the Islamic State group back to dozens of countries, including U.S.-linked supply lines, often due to the chaos of collapsing units and unsecured stockpiles.

A recent Intercept investigation revealed a direct link between U.S.-manufactured rifle rounds and cartel violence in Mexico, highlighting the far-reaching consequences of lax oversight.

“The biggest concern for the average American citizen is the potential for these arms to be used against us,” said Brandon Philips, a public affairs professor at California State University, East Bay. “We are in a position right now where we aren’t everyone’s favorite country.”

Effective arms control requires sustained, well-resourced checks, even with cooperative partner governments. However, the U.S. currently lacks a standardized system for conducting these checks. The GAO report underscores this critical deficiency, noting that Defense Department staff are often left to exercise “professional judgment” in determining what to report due to the State Department’s lack of clear definitions and timelines.

This ambiguity increases the risk that crucial cases fall through the cracks, never being formally investigated or reported. The GAO even documented instances where similar incidents received vastly different levels of scrutiny, with some triggering full document reviews and coordination while others went entirely unnoticed.

Jeff Abramson, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, emphasized the long-standing nature of these issues. “A number of us for years have talked about insufficiencies around end-of-use monitoring, and this report continues to show the problems of how this is done. The American people are attuned that a lot of harm is caused in the world by our weapons.”

While the infrastructure for tracking weapons exists – the State Department vets direct buyers, and the Pentagon has a program for enhanced end-use monitoring – the connective tissue linking these programs is demonstrably weak.

“The fact that this report is mostly about things that happened during the Biden administration, and the second part of Trump, shows it’s a systemic problem. It shows that we are going sell things and not bother,” said John Lindsay-Poland, coordinator of the nonprofit Stop U.S. Arms to Mexico. He further noted that the GAO report focuses primarily on government-to-government sales, while the majority of U.S. arms exports consist of commercial sales and small arms.

“If your priority is selling stuff,” he said, “taking into account whether the stuff you’re selling is massacring people, destroying communities, strengthening terrorists and drug trafficking, or driving immigration is secondary.”

Gaza and Double Standards: A Moment of Urgent Scrutiny

The GAO’s findings arrive at a particularly sensitive moment. The ongoing conflict in Gaza has intensified scrutiny of U.S. arms sales and their potential impact on civilian populations.

In 2024, the Biden administration implemented a policy requiring assessments of whether partners using U.S. arms in active conflicts adhere to international humanitarian law.

The administration’s May 2024 report to Congress acknowledged that it was “reasonable to assess” that Israel had used U.S.-provided arms in ways “inconsistent” with international law in some instances, while citing wartime conditions as complicating attribution. Human rights groups criticized this qualification and called for suspensions of arms deliveries, while Israel rejected the accusations.

In February 2025, the policy was rescinded.

The situation in Gaza underscores the critical need for a robust and transparent end-use monitoring system. Independent investigators and journalists have documented repeated Israeli strikes allegedly using U.S.-origin munitions against protected sites or in an indiscriminate manner. The State Department’s own human rights reporting, prior to being hollowed out this year, documented grave harms.

Abramson emphasized that failing to monitor end-use violations and report them to Congress undermines U.S. foreign policy. “Around the world, we are trying to make friends, but when they have seen our weapons being misused, it undermines that ability and makes us seem hypocritical, dangerous.”

What steps must be taken to ensure accountability and prevent U.S. weapons from fueling conflict and instability? And how can Congress effectively oversee arms sales to protect both American interests and global security?

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