Shifting Nuclear Landscape: US Strategy After New START Treaty’s Expiration
The expiration of the New START treaty has prompted a reassessment of U.S. nuclear strategy, with officials signaling a willingness to expand capabilities and engage in new arms control talks—but with a broadened scope including China. The future of nuclear deterrence is now a complex equation involving modernization, potential testing, and a delicate balance of power.
The End of New START: A New Era for US Nuclear Posture
The New START treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, officially expired last Thursday. This development, according to Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno, allows the U.S. to proceed with previously planned nuclear modernization programs. DiNanno, speaking at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, also highlighted the existence of approximately 1,900 non-deployed nuclear warheads that could be activated if deemed necessary by the President.
These potential actions include expanding current nuclear forces, diversifying capabilities, developing new theater-range nuclear systems, and adjusting the U.S.’s extended deterrence posture. This signals a shift towards a more flexible and potentially assertive nuclear strategy.
Trump’s Vision: A Multilateral Approach
Former President Donald Trump, via a post on his social media platform, proposed a different path forward. He advocated for abandoning efforts to extend New START and instead initiating negotiations for a “new, improved, and modernized Treaty” that includes both Russia and China. This call for a multilateral agreement, however, has faced resistance, particularly from China, which has consistently declined to discuss its nuclear arsenal.
Russia’s response to the inclusion of other nuclear powers—the United Kingdom and France—suggests a willingness to engage in broader negotiations, but only under specific conditions. The challenge lies in finding a framework acceptable to all parties, given their differing priorities and strategic interests.
Expert Insights: Parallel Negotiations and Transparency
Rose Gottemoeller, the former lead U.S. negotiator for New START and currently a lecturer at Stanford University, offered a compelling strategy at a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. She argued against a single, trilateral negotiation, advocating instead for parallel talks with Russia and China. Gottemoeller emphasized the decades of experience the U.S. has in limiting and reducing nuclear weapons with Russia, suggesting this established framework should continue.
“We have 50 plus years of experience limiting and reducing nuclear weapons with the Russians,” Gottemoeller stated. “We can continue that kind of process…to include tactical and hypersonic nuclear weapons.” She also agreed with previous Trump administration calls for an all-warhead limit in future negotiations with Russia.
Crucially, Gottemoeller highlighted the potential for dialogue with China, noting their apparent interest in risk reduction and establishing better communication channels. “They seem very interested in trying to figure out ways to begin a conversation with the United States about nuclear risks…developing better communications,” she observed. However, she stressed the need for greater transparency regarding China’s nuclear modernization efforts.
Retired Adm. Charles A. Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, echoed Gottemoeller’s sentiment, emphasizing the importance of responsible operation of nuclear weapon systems for all nations, including China. He suggested that confidence-building measures and transparency could serve as excellent starting points for diplomacy.
Did You Know? The U.S. has conducted more explosive nuclear tests than any other nuclear weapon state, giving it a substantial data advantage in stockpile stewardship.
Addressing Russian and Chinese Actions
Under Secretary DiNanno raised concerns about potential violations of testing moratoria by both Russia and China. He revealed that the U.S. has evidence of Russian supercritical nuclear weapons tests and alleged that China conducted a nuclear explosive test in June 2020, employing techniques to conceal the activity.
However, Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) highlighted ongoing U.S. efforts to maintain stockpile reliability through sub-critical experiments and advanced modeling at the Nevada National Security Sites, suggesting that explosive testing may not be necessary. Experts believe these methods provide sufficient data to ensure the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
The Need for Increased U.S. Nuclear Capacity?
Both Gottemoeller and Richard acknowledged the need for the U.S. to consider increasing its nuclear forces in response to the rise of Russia and China as potential peer competitors. Gottemoeller emphasized the need for judicious choices within the defense budget, while Richard advocated for immediate steps, such as uploading warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles and removing covers from submarine launch tubes—actions previously restricted by New START.
What level of nuclear modernization is truly necessary to maintain a credible deterrent in a multipolar world? And how can the U.S. balance the need for modernization with the risks of escalating tensions?
Gottemoeller underscored the importance of predictability in maintaining stable deterrence, arguing that arms control agreements bolster predictability and reduce uncertainty. Richard similarly emphasized that the U.S. nuclear posture is designed to deter aggression through the threat of escalation, a strategy that has been successful for over 60 years.
Ultimately, the current situation underscores the enduring paradox of nuclear weapons: initially conceived as instruments of terror, they have paradoxically served as a deterrent to large-scale conflict since their deployment in 1945.
Frequently Asked Questions About the New START Treaty and US Nuclear Strategy
What is the significance of the New START treaty expiring?
The expiration of New START removes constraints on U.S. nuclear forces and allows for the pursuit of modernization programs and potential expansion of capabilities, but also eliminates a key channel for communication and transparency with Russia.
What is the US stance on including China in future nuclear arms control talks?
The U.S. believes China must be part of any future arms control negotiations, but China has so far refused to engage in discussions about its nuclear arsenal.
What are “non-strategic nuclear weapons” and why are they important?
Non-strategic nuclear weapons are those with shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons. Experts like Rose Gottemoeller believe they should be included in future arms control agreements.
What is the U.S. doing to verify the effectiveness of its nuclear stockpile without explosive testing?
The U.S. relies on sub-critical experiments and robust computer modeling to assess the performance of its nuclear stockpile, providing data that experts believe is sufficient to ensure its reliability.
How does the US view Russia’s and China’s nuclear testing activities?
The U.S. has accused both Russia and China of violating their respective moratoria on yield-producing nuclear tests, raising concerns about transparency and potential escalation.
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