Trump & NATO: A Crisis of Commitment & US Leadership

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker sparked surprise last November when he expressed his anticipation for Germany to assume the supreme allied commander position, signaling a potential shift in the transatlantic alliance. The Trump administration is reportedly pursuing a strategy of incremental disengagement from NATO, aiming to encourage greater European responsibility for its own security.

UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT

The Trump administration is seeking changes to NATO, calling for member states to spend five percent of their GDP on defense and announcing plans to draw down the U.S. troop presence in Europe. However, the administration’s approach extends beyond financial contributions, with officials pushing for Europe to assume greater operational responsibility within the alliance.

Initial plans for a large-scale U.S. troop drawdown were paused after backlash from senior congressional Republicans and a congressional prohibition on reducing troop numbers below 76,000. The administration now appears to be focusing on reducing U.S. practical control of the alliance by relinquishing command of Joint Force Commands and declining to backfill U.S. service positions at NATO installations.

This pullback, including reducing personnel slots at SHAPE, the alliance’s senior military command headquarters in Belgium, could prove more consequential than withdrawing troops. The administration believes that stepping back will force Europe to step up, but historically, no major power has voluntarily surrendered control of an alliance it built and led.

REDUCTIONS IN FORCE

Whitaker’s remarks followed reports that the administration was exploring surrendering the position of supreme allied commander for Europe, a post held by the U.S. for 75 years. This prompted public rebuke from Republican representatives Mike Rogers and Roger Wicker, who warned it would jeopardize U.S. national security. The administration later nominated Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich for the position.

Despite the nomination, the administration continues to press for reforms to NATO’s military command structure, preparing to step back from leading force-generation and defense-planning processes with a goal of a European-led command structure by 2027. Washington will also turn over operational command of Allied Joint Force Command posts in Norfolk, Virginia, and Naples, Italy, to European commanders.

These reforms could make relinquishing the supreme allied commander position more likely over time, as military alliances tend to grant command to the nation contributing the most forces. The United States currently occupies approximately a quarter of the billets at SHAPE, more than any other country, and performs most core functional roles at the alliance’s military headquarters.

WITHDRAWAL SYMPTOMS

While the U.S. no longer fields the largest national force in Europe, it remains the largest contributor to NATO’s destructive capacity as the leading nuclear power in the alliance. The administration’s plans could revive the idea of dividing conventional and nuclear duties between Europe and the United States, an idea that proved unworkable during the Cold War.

Allies fear that any drawdown risks signaling a diminished U.S. commitment to Europe’s security. A conventional-nuclear split could play into Russia’s efforts to divide the United States from Europe. Tampering with planning teams at SHAPE could also hinder future NATO missions, as the Pentagon will not commit forces to operations it did not help plan.

European allies are likely to struggle to fill vacated positions at SHAPE, as their armed forces are already stretched thin. Expecting depleted militaries to produce experienced senior officers in the next two years is unrealistic.

EASIER SAID THAN DONE

The administration’s reforms could run counter to U.S. security interests. The supreme allied commander for Europe also holds the position of commander of the U.S. European Command, allowing for the immediate commitment of American forces to NATO. Reluctance to surrender operational control was a factor in opposition to NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.

Reforming NATO’s command structure could also impact U.S. operations requiring access to facilities in Europe. For example, during Operation Midnight Hammer last June, U.S. forces relied on logistics assets based in Europe. Were Washington to relinquish the supreme allied commander slot, operations like this would become more difficult.

The U.S.-South Korean military alliance offers an example of the difficulties of relinquishing control. The Combined Forces Command, established in 1978, remains largely intact with U.S. leadership, despite plans for a South Korean commander.

LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Some U.S. defense officials describe the planned shift as moving from a “one plus 31” to a “one of 32” dynamic, suggesting Europeans and Canadians should treat the United States as another ally. However, this shift would inevitably shrink the scope of U.S. control over NATO.

Abandoning the leadership post would limit the freedom to operate on the global stage, despite the administration’s claims of valuing unconstrained action. The United States’ quiet disengagement from its role as alliance manager will weaken the partnership.