US Tightens Grip on Muslim Brotherhood Affiliates Amidst Hamas Ties
WASHINGTON – In a significant escalation of counterterrorism efforts, the Biden administration, building on groundwork laid by the Trump administration, is moving to formally designate chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). The decision, announced November 24, 2025, follows intelligence assessments linking these affiliates to material support for Hamas in the wake of the October 7th attacks on Israel. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have been tasked with delivering a comprehensive report within 30 days outlining the evidence and recommending specific sanctions.
The move comes as the Muslim Brotherhood’s long-held image as a moderate political force is increasingly challenged. Recent actions by state governments in Texas and Florida, designating both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as terrorist entities, signaled a growing domestic consensus on the need for a firmer stance. Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s designation, followed by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’s similar order, have created momentum for a broader federal crackdown.
“Hamas was fundamentally born out of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Egyptian branch, a connection explicitly stated in its 1987 Charter,” explains Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director of the Counter Extremism Project. “While Hamas’s 2017 political statement didn’t explicitly reaffirm this link, it also didn’t deny it. This suggests a continuing, albeit evolving, relationship within the broader Muslim Brotherhood network.”
A Century of Influence: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Trajectory
The origins of the Muslim Brotherhood trace back to 1928 in Ismailia, Egypt, where schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Initially conceived as a movement for Islamic revival and social reform, it rapidly expanded into a mass organization by the 1940s, boasting hundreds of thousands of members. This growth was accompanied by the formation of a clandestine paramilitary wing, the Special Apparatus, responsible for bombings and assassinations targeting British forces and Jewish communities. Egypt banned the group in 1948, and al-Banna was assassinated shortly thereafter, widely believed to be at the hands of state security.
The Brotherhood’s history has been marked by cycles of repression, accommodation, and ideological adaptation. Officially renouncing violence in the 1970s, the organization focused on building a vast network of mosques, clinics, schools, and labor unions. The 2011 Arab Spring presented a unique opportunity, culminating in the election of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s first democratically elected president in 2012. However, his presidency lasted only fourteen months, ending with mass protests and a military coup. Egypt subsequently designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2013, resulting in the deaths of over 1,000 supporters during the Rabaa Square massacre and the imprisonment of tens of thousands more. Driven underground and fragmented, remnants of the organization sought refuge in Gaza and elsewhere.
Fernando Caravajal, executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, notes the Brotherhood’s remarkable ideological flexibility, allowing it to capitalize on power vacuums. However, he cautions that the current push for U.S. designation may be influenced by external actors. “The timing is telling – this announcement followed a meeting with Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia didn’t publicly demand this action during the meeting, their influence is evident, particularly given the focus on Jordan and Lebanon, which are key priorities for Riyadh.”
Riyadh’s strategic objectives center on containing Islamist movements and countering Iranian influence in the Levant. Local Brotherhood chapters have adapted differently across the region. Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) has become a prominent opposition force, operating hospitals, schools, and holding parliamentary seats. Lebanon’s network operates more loosely within Palestinian camps alongside Hezbollah, maintaining a stance of peaceful, gradualist reform.
Schindler emphasizes the tactical nature of the Brotherhood’s relationship with violence. “The Brotherhood can readily embrace violence if it perceives it as beneficial to its position and influence.”
Previous U.S. attempts to designate the entire Muslim Brotherhood faltered due to opposition from Qatar, Turkey, and some European allies. This time, the White House is pursuing a more targeted approach, focusing on individual chapters in countries that have already outlawed or designated the Brotherhood, such as Egypt and Jordan, and on Lebanon, where the lines between the Brotherhood and Hamas are particularly blurred.
Financial Warfare: The Key to Disruption
The most potent aspect of these designations lies in the potential to disrupt the Brotherhood’s financial networks. Once listed, any financial institution worldwide handling Brotherhood funds in U.S. dollars risks losing access to the American market. This creates a powerful incentive for compliance and could significantly hinder the organization’s operations.
“Disrupting access to the global financial system is a highly effective way to constrain extremist and terrorist networks,” Schindler explains. “Restricting access increases operational costs and complicates their activities.”
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The October 7th Catalyst
The immediate impetus for the current designations was the October 7th attacks and their aftermath. In Lebanon, a Brotherhood-affiliated militia, the al-Fajr Forces, openly fired rockets into northern Israel shortly after Hamas’s assault. This demonstration of support solidified concerns about the Brotherhood’s complicity.
“Hamas identifies itself as the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Gaza and the West Bank, though it operates with a degree of independence,” states Thomas Warrick, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and former DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy. “Hamas’s revenue streams are derived from governing Gaza – taxes, donations, and illicit activities.”
In Jordan, the IAF organized some of the largest pro-Hamas demonstrations in the Arab world. Rose Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, highlights the clearest link: “The rocket attacks launched by al-Fajr Forces in Lebanon following the October 7th attacks demonstrate a direct connection between a Brotherhood affiliate and Hamas’s actions.” However, Kelanic stresses that “the Muslim Brotherhood does not pose a terrorist threat to the United States.”
Intelligence reports suggest that underground networks in Egypt, despite facing repression under President Sisi, have funneled funds and propaganda into Gaza. Schindler specifically points to Lebanon’s role in facilitating Hamas’s external operations. “German court documents revealed that the Hamas cell arrested in Germany and the Netherlands in December 2023, which planned attacks in Germany, was directed by Hamas handlers in Lebanon. This suggests similar contacts likely exist within the broader Muslim Brotherhood network there.”
Navigating Regional Alliances and Domestic Concerns
Jordan is particularly vulnerable, reliant on $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid and facing internal unrest over Gaza. King Abdullah II banned the Brotherhood in April 2025, but the IAF continues to operate. Schindler believes Washington’s move will reinforce the Jordanian government’s efforts to counter the Brotherhood, while Kelanic warns of unintended consequences. “Applying the FTO designation to the IAF would be a significant interference in Jordanian politics and could destabilize the country.”
Turkey presents a more complex challenge. Schindler asserts that Turkey is a “key network hub for Hamas,” particularly regarding its financial systems. Warrick notes that Turkey’s response to the U.S. designation remains uncertain. “Supporting Muslim Brotherhood affiliates is a core tenet of Turkish policy, but President Erdoğan values his relationship with President Trump and may adjust his approach depending on the specific designations.”
A senior U.S. intelligence official, speaking on background, described the administration’s balancing act: “The President is attempting to appease various regional actors – not offending Qatar while satisfying Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. He’s walking a tightrope, leaning towards a more restrictive stance.”
Washington is wary of alienating Qatar, a crucial mediator with Islamist movements and a key partner in hostage negotiations and regional de-escalation. While the Qatar-based Brotherhood chapter formally disbanded in 1999, Doha continues to face scrutiny over alleged financial support and expressions of support from Hamas. Investigations continue to suggest ongoing backing.
The insider predicted potential domestic repercussions: “If we see a surge in state-level laws targeting the Brotherhood and CAIR, we’ll witness significant domestic impacts.”
CAIR has faced long-standing allegations of historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, stemming from the involvement of some founders in U.S.-based organizations linked to the Brotherhood and its designation as an unindicted co-conspirator in the 2007 Holy Land Foundation case. However, no criminal charges have been filed against CAIR, and no direct operational link has been proven. CAIR denies any affiliation, and much of the evidence remains circumstantial.
Analysts point out that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which already list the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, are quietly supportive of the U.S. move. However, Caravajal cautions that a blanket designation of the Brotherhood carries risks. “It could lead to the arbitrary arrest of individuals simply for attending the wrong mosque.”
For a movement that has endured bans, coups, and massacres for nearly a century, this is merely the latest challenge. Warrick concludes, “The Trump administration’s approach of targeting specific chapters is the correct one. By collaborating with countries that have already outlawed or sanctioned Brotherhood affiliates, the U.S. can achieve a more focused and effective response.”
What long-term consequences will these designations have on regional stability? And how will the U.S. balance its counterterrorism efforts with its broader strategic interests in the Middle East?
Frequently Asked Questions About the Muslim Brotherhood Designations
What is the primary reason for the U.S. considering the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization?
The primary reason is intelligence linking specific Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan to providing material support to Hamas following the October 7th attacks on Israel.
How does the U.S. designation of the Muslim Brotherhood differ from previous attempts?
Previous attempts focused on designating the entire Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, which faced significant opposition. This time, the U.S. is taking a more targeted approach, focusing on individual chapters in countries that have already banned or designated the Brotherhood.
What impact will these designations have on the financial networks of the Muslim Brotherhood?
The designations aim to disrupt the Brotherhood’s financial networks by making it risky for any financial institution handling Brotherhood funds in U.S. dollars to maintain access to the American market.
What role does Qatar play in the context of these designations?
The U.S. is wary of antagonizing Qatar, as it remains a critical mediator with Islamist movements and a key partner in regional crisis negotiations, despite ongoing scrutiny over alleged financial support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Is the Muslim Brotherhood a unified organization, or is it a collection of independent groups?
The Muslim Brotherhood is not a unitary organization but rather a network of affiliated groups with varying degrees of independence. This is why the U.S. is focusing on designating specific chapters rather than the entire organization.
What are the potential unintended consequences of designating the Muslim Brotherhood?
Potential unintended consequences include destabilizing Jordan if the U.S. insists on applying the FTO designation to the IAF, and potentially driving the Brotherhood further underground, making it harder to monitor.
Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or medical advice.
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