The Kremlin’s Praetorian Guard: Why Accountability is Unlikely

Post-war assessments in Russia will not mirror the transparent investigations common in the West. Commissions and legislative inquiries, often resulting in critical agency reviews and sweeping reforms, are unlikely to materialize. Instead, Putin will likely shield the RIS from significant repercussions. This stems from the unique role these agencies play within the Russian power structure.

The SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate – military intelligence), and the FSB (Federal Security Service) function primarily as Putin’s personal security apparatus. Their paramount objective is to safeguard his regime and maintain his grip on power. Putin’s own background – rising through the ranks of the KGB and later serving as FSB Director – further complicates matters. His perspective on the RIS is inherently biased. The carefully cultivated image of RIS invincibility is inextricably linked to Putin’s own authority; any significant tarnishing of that image threatens his position.

Should Putin and his inner circle of “siloviki” (strongmen) attempt to hold the RIS accountable, all three services will uniformly present the war as an absolute success. Each will emphasize its contributions, disregarding the immense human cost – the lives lost and military assets squandered. Throughout Russian history, from Tsarist times to the Soviet era, success or failure in war has rarely been measured by casualties or suffering. The RIS will focus on territorial gains, the prevention of Ukraine’s NATO membership (from their perspective), and a perceived weakening of the alliance – conveniently ignoring the addition of Finland and Sweden, the expansion of NATO’s border with Russia, and the revitalization of NATO’s military spending and defense industrial base.

Dissecting the Failures: A Service-by-Service Breakdown

The SVR: A Diminished Voice

Within the RIS, Putin has historically held the SVR in lower regard than the FSB. Its claims of success in Ukraine are unlikely to impress him or the siloviki. The infamous public reprimand of SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin by Putin on television, just days before the invasion – “Come on Sergey, speak up, speak plainly!” – underscored this lack of confidence. Naryshkin’s subsequent silence spoke volumes.

Lacking troops or special operations units, the SVR will likely tout the success of its “active measures” operations – covert influence and disinformation campaigns designed to weaken, confuse, and disrupt adversaries. These operations, now termed “measures of support” (MS), encompass troll farms, social media manipulation, cyberattacks, and the recruitment of agents of influence. The Russians believe these tactics contributed to their successes in Georgia (2008) and Crimea/Donbas (2014). However, in Ukraine, these efforts have largely failed to achieve their objectives, offering only marginal impact.

Expect the SVR’s influence within the RIS to continue its decline, a trend that predates the current conflict.

The GRU: Squandered Assets and Reorganization

The GRU will likely highlight various sabotage acts conducted in Europe, including explosions, arson, cable cuts, and assassination attempts – such as the thwarted plot against the CEO of Rheinmetall. These actions, carried out by units like Unit 29155 (linked to the Skripal poisoning), have largely failed to intimidate Europe or deter support for Ukraine, and may have even strengthened resolve.

A particularly egregious failure was the GRU’s deployment of its elite Spetsnaz units on the Ukrainian battlefield, resulting in heavy casualties. The planned decapitation strike against Ukrainian leadership in the initial days of the war, including the failed seizure of Hostomel airport, was a costly debacle. These highly trained units were often misused in frontal assaults, plugging gaps in the lines. Recovering their reputation will be a significant challenge.

While facing scrutiny, the GRU is unlikely to suffer severe consequences. It has already undergone a formal reorganization, rebranding itself as the “GU” (Main Directorate), though many officers still identify as “GRU-chniki.” The creation of the Department for Special Tasks (SSD) – a consolidation of direct action units – suggests a further restructuring, mirroring the CIA’s Special Activities Center, but on a much larger scale.

The FSB: Failure Shielded by Power

Despite its numerous shortcomings, the FSB, once led by Putin himself, is likely to be largely shielded from accountability. Its failures in Ukraine were arguably the most consequential. The FSB was responsible for the war’s planning, particularly the hybrid warfare aspects. Its Fifth Service, responsible for analysis and reporting to the President, miscalculated on virtually every front – Ukrainian resilience, Western reaction, and the capabilities of both the FSB and Russian Armed Forces.

FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha and Vympel participated in the war with little distinction. The FSB also leads cyber operations against Ukraine, which have failed to significantly alter the course of the conflict. Despite these failures, the FSB’s power and influence are likely to grow. As Russia’s primary internal security apparatus, it is critical to securing Putin’s rule. Furthermore, any investigation will likely be led by the FSB itself, mirroring past instances of self-exoneration, such as the investigations into the Nord-Ost theater siege and the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.

What do you believe is the most significant long-term consequence of the RIS failures in Ukraine for Russia’s geopolitical standing?

Considering the inherent biases within the Russian intelligence system, how can Western intelligence agencies best exploit these vulnerabilities to counter future Russian aggression?

Frequently Asked Questions About Russia’s Intelligence Services

• What is the primary function of Russia’s intelligence services?

  The primary function of the SVR, GRU, and FSB is to secure the power of Vladimir Putin and his regime, rather than serving the broader interests of the Russian state. They act as his Praetorian Guard.

• Why is Putin unlikely to hold the RIS accountable for the failures in Ukraine?

  Holding the RIS accountable would damage Putin’s own reputation, as their perceived omnipotence is inextricably linked to his authority. Any significant tarnishing of their image would threaten his hold on power.

• What is the difference between the SVR, GRU, and FSB?

  The SVR is the foreign intelligence service, the GRU is military intelligence, and the FSB is the internal security service. Each has distinct responsibilities, but all ultimately report to Putin and prioritize his security.

• How did the GRU’s Spetsnaz units perform in Ukraine?

  The GRU’s Spetsnaz units suffered heavy casualties and failed to achieve their objectives in Ukraine, including a planned decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership. Their reputation as elite forces has been severely damaged.

• What role did the FSB play in the planning of the Ukraine invasion?

  The FSB was responsible for the planning of the war, particularly the hybrid warfare aspects. Its Fifth Service provided flawed intelligence assessments that contributed to the miscalculation of Ukrainian resilience and Western response.