Erosion of Cohesion: A Regional Shift

Since the October 7th attacks, Israel has significantly weakened both Hamas and Hezbollah, inflicting substantial damage on their leadership and military capabilities. Driven by the aftermath of Hamas’s actions, Israel embarked on a sustained campaign to neutralize both organizations, resulting in the deaths of key commanders and the destruction of vital weaponry. For Hezbollah, the collapse of the al-Asad regime in Syria in December 2024 further complicated matters, disrupting crucial supply lines from Iran. Consequently, neither group offered substantial assistance when the U.S. and Israel conducted strikes against Iranian targets in June 2025.

Currently, Hamas remains largely on the sidelines. Hezbollah, however, responded to the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28th with a significant rocket barrage against Israel, breaching a ceasefire that had largely held since November 2024. This act, while demonstrating loyalty to Iran, simultaneously provided Israel with the justification it sought to resume hostilities, potentially aiming to seize and hold territory in southern Lebanon and dismantle or disarm Hezbollah.

The Houthis: From Saudi Rivalry to Maritime Disruption

Perhaps the most surprising evolution within the Axis has been that of the Houthis. Initially focused on conflict with Saudi Arabia, the group redirected its efforts following the outbreak of war in Gaza, launching regular missile and drone attacks against Israel and initiating a campaign targeting maritime shipping, causing widespread global disruptions. The Houthis leveraged the Palestinian cause to justify these actions, pausing attacks only during ceasefires in Gaza. In June 2025, they offered a symbolic gesture of support to Iran with a limited missile launch, but provided no meaningful military aid. As of March 7th, Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Huthi publicly warned of potential escalation, a threat likely to materialize with the continuation of the conflict.

Unlike other Axis members who have suffered significant losses, the Houthis’ primary constraint is their responsibility for governing Yemen, a challenge not shared by their allies. Analysts suggest the group is also concerned about the potential resurgence of the internationally recognized Yemeni Government, which successfully repelled secessionists in December 2025 and may now seek to regain control of Houthi-held territory.

Iraqi Shia Militias: A Shift Towards Political Ambition

Several Iraqi Shia militias are increasingly prioritizing domestic political goals over militant activity. The Iraqi legislative elections in November 2025 prompted these groups to focus on securing votes rather than advancing Iran’s agenda. Fear of retaliation from potential attacks on the U.S. or Israel, coupled with concerns about public backlash against violence and instability, led them to abstain from direct involvement in the June 2025 conflict, opting instead for rallies within Iraq. Some militias even signaled a willingness to disarm in December 2025, highlighting a shift towards political engagement.

However, groups like Kataib Hizballah (KH), designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization and considered the most capable of Iran’s Iraqi partners, have resisted calls for disarmament and actively participated in the current conflict by targeting U.S. interests. KH has spearheaded attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan and against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, in response to the offensive against Iran. The group publicly reaffirmed its commitment to avenging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death and expelling the U.S. from Iraq.

What factors will determine the future trajectory of these groups? Will the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, prioritize the Axis as a tool for projecting Iranian power? Will the IRGC maintain its financial and military support? Will Iraqi Shia militias find political solutions more appealing than violence? And, crucially, will regional governments effectively restrain the activities of these non-state actors?

The answers to these questions will shape the future of the Axis of Resistance and its impact on regional stability. What role will external actors, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, play in influencing these dynamics? And how will the internal pressures within each group – the need for governance, the pursuit of political power, and the desire for revenge – ultimately determine their actions?

Frequently Asked Questions About Iran’s Axis of Resistance